We present an empirical and large-scale analysis of malware samples captured from two different enterprises from 2017 to early 2018. Particularly, we perform threat vector, social-engineering, vulnerability and time-series analysis on our dataset. Unlike existing malware studies, our analysis is specifically focused on the recent enterprise malware samples. First of all, based on our analysis on the combined datasets of two enterprises, our results confirm the general consensus that AV-only solutions are not enough for real-time defenses in enterprise settings because on average 40% of the malware samples, when first appeared, are not detected by most AVs on VirusTotal or not uploaded to VT at all (i.e., never seen in the wild yet). Moreover, our analysis also shows that enterprise users transfer documents more than executables and other types of files. Therefore, attackers embed malicious codes into documents to download and install the actual malicious payload instead of sending malicious payload directly or using vulnerability exploits. Moreover, we also found that financial matters (e.g., purchase orders and invoices) are still the most common subject seen in Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams that aim to trick employees. Finally, based on our analysis on the timestamps of captured malware samples, we found that 93% of the malware samples were delivered on weekdays. Our further analysis also showed that while the malware samples that require user interaction such as macro-based malware samples have been captured during the working hours of the employees, the massive malware attacks are triggered during the off-times of the employees to be able to silently spread over the networks.
Introduction
Despite its ever-evolving nature, malware still is the most frequently encountered cyber threat in the world [6], severely impacting both enterprise and home networks. The damage caused may vary depending on the type of malware and digital assets accessible on the victim's network. Generally, a user has one or a few devices connected to home network, while the number of systems connected to an enterprise network can vary from hundreds to thousands with a variety of security policies in place. This complexity of the enterprise networks brings new challenges for securing valuable assets on such networks.
Reports [8] show that enterprise and home users are exposed to different types of attacks because of their distinct day-to-day usage patterns. Therefore, attacks may also differ from each other in several ways. First, since attacks on enterprise networks can be very profitable, attackers can be extra motivated to use more sophisticated, advanced, and persistent methods (i.e., targeted attacks). Second, since enterprises prefer defensein-depth approaches, which pose some restrictions on the use of the Internet and email for personal purposes, enterprise users may face less number of attacks but a wider variety of malware threats than the personal computer users [8] . Last but not least, as the attack surface is much larger on enterprise networks, with one insecure vector on the network (e.g., a misconfigured router), attackers can access the data of multiple users, and potentially stay undetected for longer periods of time.
Even though malware detection is a well-studied topic in the literature, only a few works [20, 19, 23, 24] have focused on malware samples encountered in real-world enterprises. These studies analyze security logs in order to extract intelligence on malware discovered in a specific enterprise. In another work [18] , suspicious emails and malicious attachments were examined. Compared to these studies, in this work, we analyze the samples captured on-site inside two different enterprises, i.e., not only email attachments but also file downloads. Our work aims to shed some light on what kind of malware is seen in typical, high-profile enterprises today, what the infection vectors look like, and what trends do attacks follow.
In this study, we have access to a dataset of ≈ 3.6 million samples collected from two enterprises from 2017 to early 2018 (we call Organization A and Organization B to avoid disclosing their identity and security weaknesses). Particularly, all the file downloads and email attachments of the employers from two high-profile, global enterprises are collected and analyzed. Among all the samples, only 2,942 of them have been detected as malicious, and among malicious samples, the dataset includes 122 unique samples that have never been seen in the wild (i.e., not on VirusTotal (VT)), even as of the writing of this paper3.
Moreover, this dataset has several unique features that other studies in literature do not have:
1. The samples are captured on-site inside companies. Previous studies in the literature of malware research use datasets of malware that were captured in the wild, or shared by AV companies. Hence, the malware being analyzed does not have any context for how and when the infection took place. However, our dataset has been captured through the sensors deployed on the real-world networks of two enterprises. 2. Both the behavioral analysis and Virus Total (VT) reports have been obtained during both the time of capture (i.e., just after the sample has been captured). To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any study using such a unique dataset. 3. The samples are analyzed using an advanced behavioral analysis module that we have access to4 This module is able to detect 2,920 different malicious activities of the malicious samples and the list is always updated with newly discovered malicious behaviors.
We leverage this dataset to perform the empirical analysis of malware samples collected from two organizations. We characterize our analysis under five categories.
3 July 2018 4 We explain the details of the analysis module in Section 3.
-Overall characteristics analysis:
In this, we analyze the overall statistics of both benign and malicious files in the dataset to understand the characteristics of files received and sent by enterprise employers during their daily routines. -Threat vector analysis: In this, we analyze the document types of malware used as a threat vector to infect the enterprise networks in our study. -Social-engineering analysis: In this, we analyze the file names of the malware, and the content of the malware instances to understand how users are motivated to click on the malicious artifact. -Vulnerability analysis: In this, we analyze the samples that have been labeled with a CVE number in terms of their distribution over time. -Time-series analysis: In this, we analyze the distribution of malicious samples over time to understand the logic behind the time management of attackers.
1. On average, one out of two malicious samples in our dataset were not detected by AVs on VT while almost one out of five malicious samples were not found on VT during the time of capture of the sample. 2. Documents are the most frequently used file types in both enterprises with the frequency of 72% and 36%, respectively for Enterprise-A and Enterprise-B. However, our further threat vector analysis showed that the file type distribution of malicious files is same as all files. While the most malicious file types are documents, executable and jar are the most common two file types used in malicious samples received in Enterprise B. 3. Our threat vector analysis showed that 34% of all malware samples are received in the format of jar and those malware samples are labeled as being part of massive phishing email campaigns by both AVs, and the dynamic analysis module we had access to. 4. Our social-engineering analysis showed that 51% of the malicious documents are related to a financial matter (e.g., purchase order, invoice) noting that financial subjects are the most used subjects in BEC scams. However, contrary to reports [6], we also found that 23% of all document-based malware samples are organizationallooking (e.g., attached CV) files. 5. Our vulnerability analysis revealed that 80% of the malware samples exploiting any CVE vulnerability are using the CVEs released in the year of 2017. This shows that attackers follow recent exploits, and use them more than they use older exploits. We also verified other works [18] that all of the samples utilizing an exploit has been captured after their publish date. 6. Finally, our time-series analysis revealed that as one would expect, the number of received malware during the work hours is a lot more than those captured during off times -assuming that the employees work from 8 am to 5 pm during weekdays. In contrast, there have been reports [9, 13] that have shown that some large-scale, non-human interaction requiring attacks occurred during the weekend.
Scope, Dataset, & Privacy
In this section, we explain the scope of the paper and the characteristics of our dataset. 
Scope
Enterprise malware is not well-studied in literature because gaining access to malware samples captured by enterprises is generally difficult. However, understanding the nature of the threats that enterprise users have been exposed to during their daily works is important as such threats may result in catastrophic outcomes. Compared to home users, as a part of their daily work, the enterprise users receive and send a lot more files, especially documents. Email is the most common way of communicating and transferring files, which makes it also the most common threat vector [5, 2] . However, other than allowing us to have access to email attachments and file downloads, our dataset does not include information related to the infection vector. That is, we do not have access to the contents of the emails, email headers (e.g., from, to, subject), or security logs inside the enterprise. Clearly, such information would greatly help to an analysis like ours in this work, but such information is typically difficult to acquire because of privacy concerns.
Dataset
Every file downloaded, including email attachments from two enterprises during one year, have been captured through the sensors deployed at the organizations. Sensors scan the incoming and outgoing network traffic, the traffic within the network, as well as the host activity on the network. As the sensors are directly installed on end-users' systems, they have access to the unencrypted payload. Samples are sent to the back-end of the security company that we gained access to, and all the samples are analyzed in an isolated sandbox during the time of the capture.
Our dataset includes reports of both benign and malicious samples, which are indexed based on their hashes and as well as the raw malicious files. Moreover, we have access to reports generated at different times. Both behavioral analysis results and VT results of all files have been generated at the instant of the capture. Moreover, since VT results may change over time, we also checked the VT results during the time of the experiment.5 Particularly, the dataset includes the analysis result of ≈ 3.65 million samples (3.2M from A and 450K from B), which have been captured from two organizations, namely A and B6, starting from January 2017 to February 2018. The maliciousness occurrences of samples collected from A is 0.582 %, i.e., almost every 6 files out of a thousand files an employee in the organization works on are malicious, and it is much less than 1 in a 5 July 2018 6 For privacy reasons, we do not disclose the company names. thousand in organization B. As we mentioned earlier, we also have the raw binaries of 2940 malicious samples. In the following sections, we analyze the characteristics of the malicious samples in more detail. Table 1 is the summary of main characteristics of our dataset.
Behavioral analysis results:
(a) Metadata i. Timestamp ii. Hash (i.e., SHA1) iii. File type iv. Mime type (b) The list of malicious behaviors 2. VT results (a) VT result (e.g., detection ratio, label) at the instant of the capture (b) VT result during the time of the experiment7 3. Malicious raw binaries
Privacy
Note that even though we have the privilege of having a unique, real-world attack datasets from two high-profile organizations, due to privacy policies, our analysis has some limitations. In particular, we could not correlate the captured data, and some features that are unique to the enterprises (e.g., such as the industrial sector that they are active in).
Analysis of Samples
In this section, we explain our analysis methods, results and labeling procedure. Particularly, we used two types of analysis results to label the samples: An advanced Dynamic Analysis (DA) module that was provided to us, and VirusTotal (VT). Dynamic Analysis module reports. The DA module is an advanced malware detection and analysis module that runs the samples in a sandbox and monitors their behaviors. It is capable of running the sample in an appropriate environment for different file types. For example, if the sample is an executable or document file (e.g., word, pdf), it is directly run in the proper OS (e.g., Windows) environment and its behaviors are monitored. However, if it is, for example, an archive file (e.g., zip, jar), it will be decompressed first, and then executed. In addition, if it is an HTML or URL type of sample, it will be executed in an instrumented or emulated browser. A malware sample, sometimes, can run inside more than one environment. For example, a JavaScript file can be executed by loading it in a browser as well as run directly on the operating system. While the sample reveals malicious behavior in an environment, it may not reveal in another environment. In total, 2,920 different malicious sub-behaviors under 35 total categories (e.g., evasion, packer, macro, signature) are extracted. A sample is tested against all these malicious behaviors. If the sample shows a particular malicious behavior, that specific behavior Table 2 . Ground truth labeling strategy. DA score has been obtained through the dynamic analysis module and VT positives is the number of AV detection of the given sample on VT.
has been added to the report. The report includes all of the malicious behaviors that have been revealed by the sample. A sample report that is generated after monitoring the behaviors of the sample is given in Appendix A.
After acquiring the reports of malicious behaviors and sub-behaviors, in order to classify the sample, every malicious behavior category (e.g., evasion, packer) is converted into a boolean value according to the detection of the malicious sub-behavior from that category. After that, every value is multiplied with its unique weight and summed. The final result is called a "score". If the score of a sample is less than 30, it is labeled as benign. If it is larger than 70, the sample is labeled as malicious. Samples with a score between 30 and 70 are labeled as suspicious. Note that we improve this simple classification by re-labeling the samples using the strategy in Table 2 .
VirusTotal reports. We also checked the analysis results of the samples on VT. As our dataset is dominated by the samples labeled as benign by our DA module, the number of benign samples with 0 score are 99.8% (≈ 3.65M) of all samples. Therefore, we randomly selected a subset of benign samples, and checked those samples on VT. We observed that none are on VT -hence, not detected by AVs. However, we also checked all other 19,867 unique samples with any type of malicious behavior (i.e., score> 0) detected by our dynamic analysis on VT. In order to avoid false positives of VT, we chose the threshold detection number of 3 [21] . That is, if a sample is detected by more than 3 AVs on VT, we say that the sample is labeled as malicious by VT. Otherwise, it is labeled as benign by VT.
Ground truth. In order to obtain a ground truth for the labels of the samples in our dataset, we use both the reports generated by the DA module and VT. Even though there is a consensus on some of the files, there are also inconsistencies between the DA module and VT. We follow the strategy in Table 2 in order to re-label the samples. In particular, if labels from both the dynamic analysis engine and VT match ( 1 and 5 ), the sample is labeled with the result of both tests, while if they contradict each other ( 2 and 4 ), we label them as suspicious. Moreover, not all of the samples were found on VT, where we had only DA module reports. For those ( 3 and 6 ), if it is not labeled suspicious (i.e., the score is not in [30, 70]) by the DA module, we labeled that sample with the result of that one report. Finally, if the sample is labeled by the DA module as suspicious, and found malicious by VT ( 7 ), we label it as malicious. However, if there is no consensus between the DA module and VT, we label it as suspicious. 8 not exhibiting enough malicious behavior. The analysis of suspicious files has been left as a future work as the scope of this paper is to characterize the malicious files. At the end of this labeling procedure, we classified every sample as either malicious, suspicious, or benign. In total, we have ≈ 3.6M benign, 3,767 suspicious, and 2,940 malicious samples. Note that in this classification, we used the most recent reports generated by VT, where we have also the VT reports generated during the time of capture.
Results
In this section, we present the results from a more detailed analysis and share our findings and insights. First, we analyze the overall characteristics of the dataset. Second, we analyze the file types of malicious samples to understand the threat landscape and infection vectors used in attacks. Third, we investigate the malicious documents in detail to understand the social-engineering techniques used to trick users. Fourth, we study the exploits and the corresponding CVEs found in our dataset. Finally, we compare the data from two organizations and discover the commonalities and differences from the time-series distribution of malware samples.
Overall Characteristics Analysis
Unique Malicious Samples. We obtained the hashes of 2,940 malware samples. We observed 2,766 unique samples in total. These samples were checked on VirusTotal (VT) both at the time of capture and at the time of this analysis. We call a sample: (1) unclassified if it is not found on VT; (2) undetected if it is found on VT and detected by fewer than 3 anti-virus software (AV) on VT. We found that, at the time of capture, a small fraction of the unique samples already existed on VT and were detected by AVs; 47.7% of them existed on VT but were not detected by AVs (i.e., undetected); 18.6% of them had never been submitted to VT (i.e., unclassified). It is worth noting that AVs on VT are regularly updated with signatures of newly discovered malware. We found that the numbers of undetected and unclassified samples drop significantly months later at the time of this analysis. We also observed that most of those unclassified samples are in the format of the document. This result underlines the delayed detection by AVs and thus the unsuitability of AVs for immediate detection of malware attacks at their onset. Table 3 shows the sample counts and percentages of undetected and unclassified samples at the two different times. Table 3 , at the capture time, almost one out of two malicious samples (1,318/2,763) in our dataset were not detected by AVs; almost one out of five malicious samples (514/2,763) had not been submitted to VT. This shows the ineffectiveness of the AVs in real-time malware detection. However, AVs can still be useful as the first line of defense in the defense-in-depth solutions deployed in enterprises, in order to quickly filter out the previously discovered/reported malware samples. Moreover, we also found that AVs evolve over time by adding more samples to their database. The percentage of both undetected and unclassified samples dropped to 4.4% at the time of this analysis (i.e., months after the initial malware captures). However, there were still 121 unique malicious samples undetected by AVs and 122 unique samples never submitted to VT at that time. Note that unclassified and undetected files refer to different files, so in total, we can interpret it as 243 files can not be detected by AVs. Moreover, we also note that as we did not perform analysis on historical VT reports. File type distribution. The types of samples are detected and reported by the DA module. Figure 1 shows the distribution of file types among all the samples in Organization A and B. The most common file type used in both A and B is a document, as expected, with frequencies of 73% and 36% for organizations A and B, respectively. Since the number of benign samples is a lot more than the number of malicious samples, the distribution is dominated by benign samples. However, as this is also known to attackers, they can use documents to carry or hide a malicious payload in order to bypass detection heuristics based on file types. Moreover, it is also interesting to see that scripts such as JavaScript or PowerShell scripts are commonly used in these organizations for benign purposes.
Summary of findings-1: As shown in
Although we have no visibility into what exactly scripts are used for, we can reasonably expect that may serve the purpose of automating workflows. We expect that the attackers may increasingly utilize scripts in order to infect enterprise computers and networks. Finally, we also observed that executable are much less common (respectively 1% 4% for A and B) than document-based samples. Therefore, considering that malicious payloads often exist in the form executables, it is more likely for executables propagated in company networks, especially from untrusted sources, to be malicious than documents. Fig. 2 . Top-10 malware types in our dataset, where trojan is the most common malware type for both A and B. Moreover, downloaders are a lot more common than exploits, which shows that attackers prefers simpler methods like macro-based malwares over more advanced vulnerabilities.
Malware type distribution.
In order to better understand the threat landscape in organizations, we also analyzed the types of malware samples in our dataset. The distribution of malware types observed in A and B is illustrated in Figure 2 .
We used the malware labels reported by the DA module. If a sample was undetected and unclassified by the DA module, we fetched the most recent labels from VT. We note that a sample often has different labels assigned by different AVs on VT and many of them tend to use overly generic labels (e.g., trojan). We picked more specific and descriptive labels, such as those from Microsoft and Kaspersky. Summary of findings-2: The top-10 malware types in our dataset are shown in Figure 2 . The most common malware type in our dataset is trojan for both A and B. Trojan is a generic name and mostly used for labeling samples that are not associated with any malware family or do not contain enough malware family information. Therefore, as expected, the number of trojan samples is more than other types in both A and B. In the second place, we see the downloaders, counting for 17% and 20% of malware found in A and B, respectively. The downloaders are usually embedded to documents and infect the system by downloading and installing more malware at a later stage of infection. This hidden malware is more difficult to catch due to their limited and conditional exposure. Therefore, the methods based only on static analysis are not able to extract these samples, echoing the need for combining both static and dynamic analysis for malware discovery. The fourth in both Organization A and B is exploit, meaning that samples showing the behavior of a publicly disclosed CVE. As shown in Figure 2 compared to downloaders and trojans, we observe that both organizations receive less number of exploits. This result matches the findings reported by some security companies [11, 2] . It shows that the attackers are more often using simple methods (e.g., embedding malware using document macros) than employing advanced vulnerabilities. This is because the former is much less complex to carry out than the latter while still yielding good results on unwary or security-unconscious users in enterprises. Average malware counts per day. We analyzed how the capture/appearance of malware varies over time and if it exhibits any patterns. Figure 3 shows the number of malicious samples captured per day in our dataset during the course of a year (Jan. 2017 to Jan. 2018). Summary of findings-3. According to Figure 3 , the number of malicious samples per day varies in the range from 0 to 8 for Organization A throughout the whole period whereas the same number fluctuates significantly and topped at 40 per day for Organization B. On average, A received 0.6 malicious and 8K benign samples (downloads and email attachments) per day while B received 7.7 malicious and 1,300 benign samples per day. B has seen 80 times more malicious samples than A. This discrepancy indicates that the risks of attacks and malware infection can vary a lot across different organizations and industry sectors, revealing attacks being driven by nature and potential value of the target businesses. Moreover, we tried to identify the cause to the spikes in Figure 3 . But we could not find any major security events or reports for those dates. We suspect that the spikes were resulted from some hidden attacks targeting that particular organization or sector.
Threat Vector Analysis
Attackers use not only executable files but also other types of files such as MS office documents (e.g. docx, xlsx) or archive files (e.g., jar, zip) to spread malware. Using documents, the attackers can embed the malicious code and run within a document itself. This embedding can happen in the form of, for instance, macros in MS Office documents and JavaScript (JS) in pdf files. Since MS Office 2016, macros have been disabled by default in documents [10] . Similarly, JS code has been disabled by default in PDF readers. Therefore, unlike executables, the malicious code does not execute in the first place when a user opens the document. Instead, the user is asked to "enable active content". To adapt to such security countermeasures, attackers now try to convince users to enable the macros and scripts using social-engineering techniques, e.g., showing images with fake warnings for users to "Enable content". When accompanied by very convincing messages or emails, users may easily fall for these tricks. Once the macros have been enabled, the embedded malicious code is triggered, which goes on to download and run the actual malware or full malicious payload. Moreover, Java (jar) archive files have been widely used and have seen a surge in recent malicious email campaigns [3] , where the malicious payload is compressed (zip or rar) and attached to the email. This file format is preferred by the attackers as it is relatively less-known file type for malicious files. Plus, it benefits from the cross-platform nature of Java. In addition to macros and JS, we also observed other types of scripts. For example, PowerShell scripts have been used to infect Windows PC. In Figure 4 , we plot the 10 most malicious file types used in A and B, among which 6 are common between A and B. Figure 1 shows that 73% and 36% of the files observed on the company networks are document-based files, compared to only 1% and 4% for executable files, for A and B, respectively. We found that Java archive files are the most common file type used in malware samples targeting B while executable files are the most common for A. Both types of files require manual actions to be triggered. Malware written in Java can run on any platform that has JVM (Java Virtual Machine) installed, i.e., does not require the knowledge of the system that the victim is using. Therefore, they are highly preferred for phishing email campaigns. We also saw the samples of commercial RAT (Remote Access Trojan), such as Jrat, Adwind, Jaraut. For B, we observed that 34% of all malware samples are jar files and we also saw that all of the Java malware samples are labeled as part of phishing email campaigns by AVs. Therefore, one can reasonably suspect that the list of emails of A may have been leaked to attackers. Moreover, our results confirm the findings of the other reports [11, 2] that document-based malicious files are still highly preferred by attackers as they are often considered safe by the average users.
Summary of findings-4.

Malicious file is received
2. Content is enabled by the user 
Macro or JS code is executed
Malicious payload is downloaded and installed
Social-engineering analysis
According to recent reports published by Microsoft [8] , there is a recent transition from exploits to macro-based malware to infect endpoints. In our dataset, we observed 1,370 malicious documents while there is only 158 samples associated with a publicly known vulnerability. Even though macros have been disabled by default since 2016, it continues to be a common threat vector for massive pishing campaigns like Locky, Cerber [7]. This still poses threats mainly because people fall victim to social engineering tricks, and in turn, grant permissions to malicious samples. Therefore, it is important to understand and prevent social-engineering techniques used by the attackers.
What happens if a user is tricked to enable the macros or JavaScript in pdf documents? In order to find out, we also run the samples in an isolated environment and observed their behaviors. Figure 5 shows the infection chain of document-based malware samples. Malicious documents are usually received as an attachment to emails, which direct users to enable dynamic content or scripts. When a user does so, the code runs, downloads the actual malicious payload, and then installs it on the victim's system. Method. In order to understand the social-engineering techniques used by attackers, we performed the following analysis. First, we analyzed the file names of the samples when received by the victim. Since the samples in our dataset were renamed using their hash values, we fetched the original filenames of the documents from the VirusTotal's database. Second, we also analyzed the subject of the document as inferred from file names and actual file content. Based on inferred subjects, we categorized all the documents into several categories. We observed that some of the samples only include "content enable" images and do not have a meaningful file name. We categorized them as No-content files.
Fig. 6. Distribution of the subject in malicious documents. 51% (313/615) of the malicious documents Organization B received have been shown as related to a financial matter, while it is hard to comment on Organization A, as it has a very limited number of samples (36 samples.)
Summary of findings-5. The subject distribution is shown in Figure 6 . 51% (313/615) of the malicious documents Organization B received have been shown as related to a financial matter, which is similar to the results reported by Symantec [12] showing that financial subjects are the most used in business email compromise (BEC) scams. However, unreported in [11] , we found that 23% of all document-based malware pretends to be usual business files of various kinds. For example, emails related procurement orders and resumes are highly common in the malicious documents found in B. In order to better understand the techniques used by attackers, we also analyzed the file subject in more details and plotted the counts for each subject word (Figure 7) . The most commonly used keyword is "resume", accompanied by a name (e.g., "Rebecca-Resume.doc"). Other commonly used phrases are mostly related to finance such as "order", "invoice", or "payment". Moreover, their acronyms like "PO", "RTQ", "INV" etc. are also mostly preferred to trick the victim. 
Vulnerability Analysis
Newly discovered and reported vulnerabilities in software are assigned an ID, called CVE, as a uniform reference among vendors and security researchers. If AVs detect that a malicious sample exploits a vulnerability, it labels the sample with its publicly known CVE ID. In this section, we share the details about the vulnerabilities found in the samples and their characteristics. Method. In order to tag the malware samples with a CVE identifier, we used three sources. The first one is our DA module. It matches the vulnerability behavior with the malware's behavior i.e., if the particular behavior is observed, the sample is labeled with the given CVE instead of malware type related to that behavior. Second, we used the labels provided by Microsoft and Kaspersky on VT. We observed 158 samples in total that use at least one vulnerability with a CVE. We observed a discrepancy between the samples labeled by them. For instance, five samples are tagged as the exploit of CVE-2014-1761 by Kaspersky and as CVE-2012-0158 by Microsoft. We counted those samples twice, which does not affect the overall results much due to the small numbers of such cases. Summary of findings-6. Table 4 shows the list of nine CVEs found in our dataset. Publish date, affected product, and vulnerability type are taken from [4] . First seen on VT and capture time are the respective dates for the first sample in our dataset. AV detection ratio is the average detection ratio of all samples tagged with a specific CVE ID. As shown in Table 4 , 80% of the exploits are targeting the CVEs released in the year of 2017. This shows that attackers tend to use recent exploits for better results. This is because many systems now automatically patch known vulnerabilities within a short window (e.g., a few months). The chances for a successful exploit is higher if more recent vulnerabilities are targeted than older vulnerabilities. This also shows that attackers are fast in following and leveraging new CVEs.
Moreover, we also saw that malware using CVE-2017-8759 appeared only two days after its release date. The first sample exploiting CVE-2017-8570 was captured 50 days after its public release. In general, we observed that a sample exploiting a vulnerability can be seen in the wild after a period of a few months or even just days since the vulnerability disclosure. Therefore, it is important to patch vulnerabilities as soon as possible. On the other hand, when we analyzed the samples for Organization B, we saw that on average, B received the samples exploiting vulnerabilities three months after their disclosure dates. Figure 8 shows the distribution of exploits in our dataset over time in terms of their captured dates and initial disclosure dates. In a similar work [18] , it was shown that none of the exploits were used before their public disclosure. We also verify that all of the samples utilizing an exploit were been captured after the CVE disclosure dates. 
Time Series Analysis of Malicious Samples
Attackers use many different techniques to trick users. Some of these tricks depend on proper timing. For example, employees may receive the malicious samples at a certain time of the day, or specifically on some days. In this section, we analyze these timingrelated factors from the victim's perspective. We use the capture time of the malicious samples in our time series analysis. Working hours vs. Off-times. According to the reports [1] , the largest number of security threats are detected on weekdays, i.e., when employees are working on their computers. In order to verify if this pattern exists in our dataset, we plot the distribution of malicious samples frequency for each day of the week in Figure 10 and for each hour during the day in Figure 9 . Summary of findings-7. Based on Figure 9 and 10, the number of received malware during the work hours is a lot bigger than that number for off-hours, assuming employees work from 8 am to 5 pm on weekdays. However, there are also reports [9] and some massive attacks [13] contradicting with our finding. Especially, the attacks utilizing a vulnerability prefer weekends as they may want to spread over the network without being detected. However, the malware that require to be enabled by the victim are going to prefer working hours.
Related Work
Malware detection has been an active research area for years. There have been numerous studies [14, 15, 22, 16] working with large-scale malware dataset with the sizes of the datasets changing from a hundred thousand to millions and on different problems such as detection, clustering, indexing, etc. In all these studies, the samples captured different sources and were brought together for evaluating the proposed method, or collected in the wild, where the target entity is unknown. However, in practice, while it is known that home and enterprise users are known to have different threat landscapes, it is not clear if different enterprises actually have been targeted by different types of threats. In our study, we perform an analysis of such a dataset and provide the characterization of malicious samples captured from two different enterprises. Enterprise malware detection. In the literature, there are only a few works [20, 19, 23, 24, 17] about enterprise malware. All of these studies analyze security logs in order to extract some intelligence related to malware encounters occurred in a specific enterprise. In another work [18] , the authors analyze suspicious email collected from two members of an NGO, where both the content of the emails, and malicious email attachments were used for the analysis. Compared to the datasets used in these studies, our dataset was collected from specific commercial enterprises from 2017 to early 2018 and the samples were analyzed during the capture time with both a DA analysis module as well as VT. Note that to date, there have not been many scientific works that have reported on what kind of malware high-profile organizations are faced on a daily basis. In this paper, we aim to bridge that gap.
Conclusion
In this work, we presented an analysis of malware samples captured from two different enterprises from 2017 to early 2018. First, as one would expect, our analysis on the combined dataset showed that only-AV solutions are not effective in real-time defense because on average, 40% of the malware samples were either not detected at all, or have never been seen in the wild yet during the incident. Second, as employees in a typical enterprise work with more documents than executables, attackers mostly use documents as an attack vector. Hence, frameworks that allow the processing of documents in the cloud would provide better protection against many such attacks. In our vulnerability analysis, we also found that attackers use recently disclosed CVEs more than older disclosures. Additionally, after our social-engineering analysis, we also found that financial issues are still the most common subject used in social-engineering attacks against the enterprises that we analyzed.
A A sample malicious behaviours report generated by the DA module
The list of malicious behaviours extracted via the DA module from a given sample:
"Anomaly: Found suspicious security descriptors for lowering the integrity level", "Autostart: Registering for autostart during Windows boot", "Evasion: Potentially malicious application/program", "Evasion: Potentially malicious application/program (MMX stalling code detected)", "Evasion: Targeting anti-analysis/reverse engineering", "Evasion: Trying to enumerate security products installed on the system from WMI", "Execution: Anomalous execution of VBScript file", "Execution: Attempt to download / exec with javascript / vbscript code", "Family: EICAR test sample", "Packer: Potentially unwanted application/program (VMProtect)", "Steal: Targeting Firefox Browser Password", "Steal: Targeting Internet Explorer Browser Password", "Steal: Targeting Opera Browser Password", "Steal: Targeting Outlook Mail Password", "Steal: Targeting Windows Saved Credential", "Stealth: Creating executables masquerading as browser clients", "Stealth: Creating executables masquerading as files from a Java installation", "Stealth: Creating hidden executable files", "Stealth: Modifying attributes to hide files"
B Massive malware attacks in our dataset
The following is the list of most frequently captured malware samples in our dataset. 
